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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue 
of the order of the Utah Supreme Court (plated November 6, 1987, 
and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the judgment entered on August 
31, 1987, by the Honorable Boyd L. Park, Fourth District Court 
Judge, in favor of respondent Western Sujrety Company and against 
appellant Joseph F. Ollivier on Western Surety Company's 
third-party complaint for indemnification. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Respondent is satisfied with appellant's statement. 
B. Statement of Facts 
1. On December 1, 1978, respondent Western Surety 
Company ("Western Surety"), as surety, issued a motor vehicle 
dealer's bond to Herf's Heritage Motors, Inc., as principal. The 
bond is reproduced at A-l. 
2. In conjunction with the issuance of said bond, 
appellant Joseph F. Ollivier ("Ollivier"), among others, signed 
an Application for Bond ("indemnity agreement"), an integral part 
of which contains provisions for the indemnification of Western 
Surety on the bond. (Findings of Fact Nos> 1 and 5, reproduced 
at A-5; Trial Trans, p. 135, reproduced at A-9.) The Application 
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for Bond is reproduced at A-4. 
3. At the time Ollivier signed the indemnity 
agreement, he was a shareholder in Heritage Motors and providing 
financial support to Heritage Motors. (Findings of Fact Nos. 2, 
4; Trial Trans, pp. 96-97, reproduced at A-10 and 11.) 
4. At the time Ollivier signed the indemnity 
agreement, he possessed a substantial educational and business 
background (Trial Trans, pp. 92-94, 137, reproduced at A-12 to 
15.) 
5. Sometime in 1982, Ollivier no longer intended to be 
affiliated with Heritage Motors. (Trial Trans, p. 113, 
reproduced at A-16.) 
6. Ollivier never notified Western Surety of any 
intent on his part to withdraw as indemnitor under the indemnity 
agreement, (Trial Trans, p. 108, reproduced at A-17), and never 
notified Western Surety of the termination of his business 
interests with the principal Heritage Motors. (See Appellant's 
Brief, p. 2.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly found Western Surety entitled 
to indemnification from appellant Ollivier under the terms and 
conditions of the indemnity agreement signed by Ollivier. Under 
governing law, the indemnity agreement was to be terminated at the 
will of either party and only by clear and unequivocal notice to 
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the other party. It is undisputed that neither Western Surety 
nor Ollivier gave such notice. Therefore, the agreement was 
never terminated. 
The mere fact that Ollivier concluded his business 
relationship with the principal to the ijmderlying bondf which 
fact was also not disclosed to Western Surety, does not somehow 
terminate his contractual relationship w|ith Western Surety. Such 
an argument is contrary to case law as well as fundamental 
principles of contract. Moreover, the fkct that the terms of the 
bond required annual premiums did not impose a similar 
requirement of an annual renewal of the Separate indemnity 
agreement in the absence of such terms ir) said agreement. 
Finally, Western Surety is entitled as a surety to the 
protection for which it bargained in the Indemnity agreement. 
Western Surety reasonably expected that the extent of the 
indemnity obligation was to be the same a£ the outer limits of 
its own risk exposure with respect to the bond. It is only fair 
and reasonable to require Ollivier to provide the same clear and 
unequivocal notice of withdrawal from his obligation that Western 
Surety would be legally obligated to provide in the event it 
sought to withdraw as surety. In the absence of such notice, 
both Western Surety and Ollivier must remain bound by the legally 
enforceable agreement. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENFORCED THE DULY 
EXECUTED INDEMNITY AGREEMENT IN THE ABSENCE 
OF AN EFFECTIVE TERMINATION OR REVOCATION 
OF THE AGREEMENT. 
A. Where An Indemnity Agreement Does Not Expressly 
Limit Its Duration, It Is A Contract Terminable At 
Will Upon Notice of Either Party. 
While the appellant draws this Court's attention to the 
indemnity agreement's silence relative to its duration and 
termination, the appellant wholly fails to direct this Court to 
the applicable rule of law: 
"A contract of indemnity continues in 
force only during such time as is 
expressly or impliedly provided for in 
the contract, and if no such time is 
fixed for its duration, it is a contract 
terminable at the will of either party." 
41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indemnity, Section 8 (1968). The Utah Supreme 
Court has adopted this rule and has further held that such 
termination "must be with notice to the other party which is 
clear and unequivocal." Insurance Company of North America v. 
Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc., 617 P.2d 366, 368 (Utah 1980). 
See also, Consolidated Theatres v. Theatrical Stage E.U.L., 447 
P.2d 325 (Cal. 1968), an often-quoted case in regards to the 
duration of contracts generally when no express term exists in 
the contract itself. The court stated at page 335: [continued on 
page 5.] 
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In his unsuccessful motion for summary judgment in the 
trial court, the appellant himself referred to this general rule 
as "encyclopedia law," arguing that the indemnity agreement 
clearly provided that the duration of the agreement was the 
one-year term applicable to the underlying bond. On appeal, 
appellant now argues the opposing view $nd emphasizes the 
uncertainty and ambiguity in the agreement relative to its 
duration. Contradiction aside, neither lof appellant's arguments 
properly apply the acceptable general rujle. 
In Insurance Company of North America v. Lanseair Travel 
Agency, Inc., supra, a travel agency ("principal") entered into a 
ticket agency contract with an association of airline carriers, 
who required the principal to provide a Surety bond. An 
insurance company ("surety") issued a boijid on condition that both 
the principal and its president, in his individual capacity, 
execute an indemnity agreement. Just before the annual bond 
premium was due, the president sold his ownership interest in the 
principal and requested by letter that the association inform the 
[Continued from page 4] 
"In such cases, the law usually implies 
that the term of the duration shall be at 
least a reasonable time, and that 
obligations under the contract sfrall be 
terminable at will by any party upon 
reasonable notice, after such reasonable 
time has elapsed." [Emphasis addted.] 
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surety that he would no longer be personally liable on the bond. 
The letter was never received and the surety was never notified. 
Owing to financial problems, the principal never paid 
the annual premium and the airline carriers began filing claims 
against the bond for losses on ticket sales. The surety paid the 
claims and subsequently sued the former president as indemnitor 
under the indemnity agreement. The indemnitor argued in defense 
that he was not liable under the agreement since (1) it had been 
revoked and (2) it had expired due to non-payment of premiums. 
The trial court enforced the agreement and held him liable as 
indemnitor. The Supreme Court affirmedf finding (1) that the 
surety never received the required notice of revocation and (2) 
that the bond had not automatically expired upon non-payment of 
premiums but had continued in force for thirty days thereafter, 
under the terms of the agreement, during which time the losses 
occurred. 617 P.2d at 368. 
In this case, the appellant argues that since the 
indemnity agreement in question did not expressly limit its 
duration or define the method for its termination, he should 
somehow be excused from providing Western Surety with the 
required notice of his revocation. Such an argument is neither 
fair nor reasonable under the circumstances and runs contrary to 
the applicable rule of law relied upon in Lanseair Travel Agency 
and upon which the appellant himself had earlier relied. 
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A review of the indemnity agreement in the Lanseair 
Travel Agency case shows the relevant language to be very similar 
to the agreement in question here. Spepifically, there is no 
express limitation on the duration of the agreement. Rather, the 
Lanseair agreement merely provided in pertinent part as follows: 
"In consideration of the inclusion of the 
undersigned in the Schedule Bond as 
aforesaid, the undersigned agrees to. . . 
fully indemnify and save Surety harmless 
from and against all loss, costs, 
charges, suits, damages, counsel fees and 
expenses of whatever kind or nature which 
the Surety shall sustain or incur or be 
put to, by reason or in consequjence of 
the Surety having included the 
undersigned in the aforesaid Schedule 
Bond, or any continuation thereof or any 
successory obligation in the sajne or a 
different amount;. . ." 
617 P.2d at 36 8. In concluding that such terms bound the 
indemnitor "until the agreement was properly revoked or 
terminated," the court expressed no concern over the agreement's 
silence relative to its duration and termination. The court 
never considered the agreement as uncertain or ambiguous. 
Instead, the court simply cited and relief upon the general rule 
set forth in 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indemnity, Section 8 (1968), that an 
indemnity agreement is revocable at will i^pon notice by either 
party. 617 P.2d at 368. 
In this case, the relevant language in the agreement in 
question provides in pertinent part as follows: 
-7-
"The undersigned applicant and 
indemnitors hereby request WESTERN SURETY 
COMPANY, (the Company) to become surety 
for and furnish the above bond and such 
other bonds as may now or hereafter be 
required by or on behalf of the 
applicant. 
The undersigned. . .jointly and severally 
in consideration of the Company becoming 
surety, or executing or guaranteeing any 
bond for the applicant, do for value 
received hereby covenant, promise and 
agree to pay the Company the usual 
premium, and jointly and severally agree 
and indemnify and keep indemnified the 
Company from and against any liability, 
and all loss, cost, charges, suits, 
damages, counsel fees and expenses 
whatsoever which the Company shall at any 
time sustain or incur, for or in 
consequence of the Company having become 
surety or entering into such bond. . ..w 
[Emphasis added.] 
These terms clearly suggest, as did those at issue in Lanseair 
Travel Agency, that the indemnity agreement provides a continuing 
obligation not necessarily limited to a single bond. Moreover, 
in absence of an express provision relative to its duration or 
termination, the obligations thereunder are to continue unless 
and until either (1) termination by either party upon notice, or 
(2) termination of the underlying bond. 
B. Appellant's Withdrawal From the Principal's Business 
Did Not Revoke or Terminate the Indemnity Agreement. 
Appellant argues that "it is logical and reasonable to 
rule that Mr. Ollivier's contract for indemnity ended at the end 
of the year he withdrew from any ownership interest in the 
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business [of the principal]." See Appellant's Brieff p. 4-5. 
Appellant seems to be asking this court} to rule, as a matter of 
law, that an indemnitor must be required to have an economic 
I 
interest in a principal before indemnifying the principal's 
surety on the bond. Such an argument c&nnot be supported by the 
terms of this agreement, statutory or c^se law, or the ordinary 
course of dealing in indemnification agreements. 
In Aetna Insurance Company v. Buchanon, 369 So.2d 351 
(Fla. App. 1979), the court held that ar} individual indemnitor 
should not be entitled to unilaterally tjerminate his obligation 
under an indemnity agreement on the sole) basis that his business 
relationship with the principal had terminated. In that case, as 
in this one, the court was dealing with an indemnity agreement 
that was silent as to the means of its termination. The court 
found no ambiguity by reason of the agreement's silence and 
simply concluded: 
"It seems obvious to us that the parties 
intended, and certainly the surety 
expected, that the extent of the 
indemnity obligation was to be tlfie same 
as the outer limits of the surety's risk 
exposure with respect to the bond. To 
say than an indemnitor under such an 
arrangement may unilaterally cancel any 
further indemnity obligation on his part 
while the bond remains in effect would 
contradict the clear provisions c^f the 
indemnity agreement and undermine) the 
protection for which the surety 
bargained." 369 So.2d at 354. 
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In response to the indemnitor's defense that it would be "absurd 
and unconscionable" to leave him exposed to liability for the 
conduct of a principal with whom he had severed business 
relations, the court responded: 
"This is not an absurd or unconscionable 
result but the foreseeable consequence of 
[the indemnitor's] assumption of the 
indemnity obligation. We can find no 
authority for the proposition that an 
individual who undertakes an obligation 
as indemnitor on behalf of a principal to 
whom he then has a business relationship, 
thus making the arrangement advantageous 
to both, should be entitled to terminate 
that obligation when the business 
relationship has ended and the 
arrangement is no longer beneficial to 
the indemnitor. His motive for 
undertaking the obligation may no longer 
exist, and indeed he may have every 
reason in the world for desiring to 
relieve himself of the obligation, but he 
nevertheless remains bound by the clear 
language of the agreement." 369 So.2d at 
354. [Emphasis added.] 
In Lanseair Travel Agency, the Utah Supreme Court 
expressly required that the individual indemnitor, who had 
similarly sold his ownership interest in the principal, to 
provide "clear and unequivocal" notice to the surety before 
effectively revoking the agreement. The court added: "it is fair 
and reasonable that the indemnitor can absolve himself from 
liability only after giving the surety reasonable time to secure 
a release from its own liability." 617 P.2d at 368. 
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In this casef the appellant indemnitor admits that he 
"did not notify Western Surety of the germination of his business 
interest with Heritage Motors." See Appellant's Brief, p. 2. 
Furthermore, it is undisputed that appelllant never notified 
Western Surety of his intentions to revoke or terminate the 
indemnity agreement. Under the foregoing law, appellant is 
accordingly precluded from denying liability under the indemnity 
agreement. 
C. Appellant's Continuing Obligations Under The 
"indemnity Agreement Were Ncj>t Conditioned OrT"An 
Annual Renewal Of The Agreement. 
Appellant argues in passing th4t Western Surety was 
required to renew its indemnity agreement with the appellant on 
an annual basis. Appellant's Brief, p. 4-5. Appellant provides 
no basis whatsoever for this proposition], aside from implying 
that since the bond required annual premiums, the indemnity 
agreement should require an annual renewal. Such a groundless 
proposition runs directly contrary to th$ above-quoted general 
rule providing that where an indemnity agreement is silent as to 
its duration, it is a contract terminably at will upon the notice 
of either party. 
Although the appellant may by himself conclude it 
advisable for a surety to annually check t>n its indemnitors, 
neither he nor this Court may properly impose such a procedure as 
a legal obligation in the absence of statute or contract terms to 
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that effect. Moreover, it should be noted that the indemnity 
agreement in question was signed by the appellant in 1978. The 
appellant did not sell his ownership interest in the principal 
until 1982. The appellant certainly knew or should have known 
that Western Surety Company had no intentions of renewing the 
indemnity agreement on an annual basis and that Western Surety 
considered the application and indemnity agreement a one-time 
transaction that would remain in full force and effect so long as 
2 
the bond or successive bonds remained in effect. As such, the 
indemnity agreement becomes a contract terminable upon clear 
notice by either party. Insurance Company of North America v. 
Leanseair Ticket Agency, Inc., supra. 
Unlike the factual situation in Lanseair Ticket Agencyf 
the underlying bond in this case was never terminated. There is 
no question as to whether the annual premiums had been paid at 
the time the losses occurred. The bond continued in full force 
and effect without regard to the appellant's business dealings/ 
all the while subjecting Western Surety to potential liability 
for claims against the bond. In order for Western Surety to 
withdraw as surety on the bond, it would have been required to 
See generally, Holmgren v. Utah Idaho Sugar Company, 582 P.2d 
856 (Utah 1978), wherein the court recognized that "contracts are 
not void or voidable merely because they may be of long duration 
or last in perpetuity." 582 P.2d at 860. 
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give reasonable notice of withdrawal. The principal would 
naturally be entitled to such notice irii order to allow him to 
properly seek and obtain alternative insurance. 
By the same argument, it is or}ly fair and reasonable for 
Western Surety to be entitled to reasonable notice from an 
indemnitor who intends to withdraw, thereby ensuring Western 
Surety the protection for which it bargained and allowing it the 
necessary time to secure its own release from its obligations. 
See, American Surety Company of New Yorl|c v. Blake, 27 P.2d 972, 
974 (Idaho 1933); Aetna Insurance Co. v1 Buchanon, supra, 369 
So.2d at 354. There is no disputing th^ fact that Western Surety 
was never given such notice. 
CONCLUSION 
Controlling law, as well as principles of fairness and 
reasonableness, required the appellant tq provide Western Surety 
with "clear and unequivocal" notice of termination before 
effectively relieving himself of his leg^l obligations under the 
indemnity agreement. Appellant admits ttjiat he failed to provide 
Western Surety with such notice. Furthermore, appellant's 
termination of his business association with the principal, of 
which appellant also admittedly never notified Western Surety, 
does not under controlling law constitute a termination of the 
indemnity agreement. Finally, the one-year term of the bond did 
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not somehow work to terminate the indemnity agreement which did 
not under its terms require an annual renewal. 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent Western Surety 
Company respectfully requests this Court to affirm the holding of 
the trial court that the indemnity agreement in question was in 
full force and effect at the time of the losses at issue and 
therefore require the appellant Joseph L. Ollivier to indemnify 
Western Surety for the same. 
DATED this IQ^ day of f^6ili/4-A^1 1988. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
PLANT 
CHRISTENSEN 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent to be hand-delivered on this !P^ 
day of February, 1988, to the following: 
Allen K. Young 
Young & Kester 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
3/brief 
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tOJOftno^  nto onto or 00*0 Hconto ond on tctwruf ronowott tnoroot, mon tno ooovo ootioojtion ojiojtt oo nynj one? 
oof0(» ojnorwojo to njmojm o\ ton tprco ond oftoct* 
•no oorory norom rooorwjt mo rtpjnt to wmtctpow ot tycfi tyrory oocopr oo to ony^m^owoy oo?oo)oy*'Oj* 
Comtol or oocryoo tioroyndor' ond moy do to ypon mo o t^vin i^ of wrdfon nonoo of toon wtojiavojwoji nt O t ; 
pftnolpo* ono to ttio Motor Vofticio oottnott Adrnmiomttorj providod* howovor, thot no wnYidfOFWol viow oo 
offoctivo for ony pyrpoto until tiafy doyt tholl novo tlootod from ond oftor mo roeoipt of tych noHco by tho 
to»d odmintttrotcir. ond fyrthor proyidod mot no withdrawal shoU in anywtao offoct tho liob*ftf> of tcid 
tvroty orttmy ovt of froud or froydulont roprttontotiont or for ony ««O4QI»O«» U# violation* of Mi*d low by 
tho principal h#r«undor prior to tho o«pirotion of tuch poriod ^ %«ty doyt, rogordlott of whothor or not tho 
lott tufforod hat boon 'oducod to |udcjmont ooforo tho lopto of timfy doyt 
Si^nod and toaiod th«t 1 4 t h day of D O C « b o ) r 9 79 
Principal 
WESTERN JURTTY COMPANY 
ATTfST 
• y 
COUfMT Uf 
On tK»S doy or t d o f f me p~r,onul!y come 
,_ , to rne Ivno^ep 
one known to me to oe the person and deicnLed <n and who executed tne forcqeovj instrument, and* 
oc'(Pow>dgeu 'a me t*at he titcufed the *ame 
(SCAt) 
Notary Pvbl»c 
Gorr.m^>ron Empires 
PARTNERSHIP OR FIRM ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRINCIPAL 
ST4TE CF UTAH 
COUNTY Of 
On t h i s day of 1° . before me pertonolly oppoared 
.... to me known 
ond known t© mo to be ono of the firm of .... ... .. .. **~* 
devcnb*«J in ami who executed the M m t as and far the act and 6m^d of said firm 
> Notary Public 
Comn^jsion E*piret 
CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRINCIPAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY Of 
On tho day of .. ... in tno yoar ^ b e f c r « * # * e par* 
illy como .. _ _ to mo known, who, bowta; by mk 
etory sworn, did depose and My* That Ko reeidet in ^ L . -—..« 4 ^ t no ift 
described tn and which executed tho above imtrymont; thot ho know the tool c4 said corporctttoaclhat thm *#* (_ 
afftxod to M id intrr j m e m wot toch corporofe tool; that it wot to affixed by order of the l o o m of Director 
of toid corporation, and that Ko wonod Hit noma thereto by like order. 
Co*nm«tt*on Esptrot .. , ^ „ Notary Public 
CORPORATE ACXNOWUDGMENT OF PfUNOPAL 
(To bo m i n m l b y 
ITATf Of UTAH 
COUNTY Of 
On tno day of - * in the year _, bofora mo pm* 
turniUy oppeored ., to me knowr., who, being by *»o 
du'v %**<*n, did depose and toy: That ho resides •-* ... _
 0 that ha it 
me . . of tho . . . » tho computation 
which executed tho above . .Foment and which it described therein; that he ticjnod 'he above men honed 
mfiru'nen* on behalf of void corporatton, thot he wat authorised to do to by Article . . ef tho Article* 
of Incorporation of the *a»d corporation and bs oraer of the ooord of Director* or said corporation, and mat 
h»» signature at it thut appears m *he above mt'rwmenr it binding, upon tno corporation. 
'.StAO 
Commission Expi/et Notary PuOhc 
AFFIDAVIT Of- QUALIFICATION 
C O W N f Of JJAWT* C L A * A 
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B I D S ft 
•IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREElj) THAT THE BOND 
IS AMENDED TO SHOW TH2 CORRECT NAME OF THE 
PRINCIPAL AS: HERITAGE MOTORS. INC." 
Nothing herein contained shall be held to vary, alter, waive or extend any of the terms, limits or coMt 
tion* of the Bond except as hereinabove set forth. 
This Rider becomes efTt>ctive on the lAfJ l day of D e c e m b e r 197JL. at 
twelve and one minutu o'clock A M , Standard Time. 
Attached u> and forming part of I??™* No.... 2 3 8 1 7 7 5 A * , ^ D e c e m b e r 1 4 t h t« 7 8 
issued b> the WESTERN SL'RETY COMPANY OK SIOUX FALLS. SOUTH DAKOTA, tfl 
Herfjs Heritage Motors, Inc . 
Signed this x 15*1—A day of December
 # «78 
i j» 
V. E S T E R N S U R E T Y C O M P A N Y 
B y . . _ . _ . . H 
Authorized Representative 
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*L*C TO bat 
fc0«#*ttt. 
WEgTER Y COMPANY 
APPLICATION FOR BOND— ANY KIND 
ftiPORTANT 
AtUcfc explanatory letUc 
ty ihouid haen add 
COMPLETE SECTION 10 ON BACK PAGE FOR ALL BONOS 
if you feel Sure tifc itional information. 
Hum of AppliciM, tigff *S. H < * n V \ n r H r t > > » . I n ^ 
I f o e eo-oortaotatup. «**» futt M « W of poftneta and t 
,A*#. 
Individual 
Partneraftip 
. Corporation 
a 
a 
,oTy\ S^fe U^ nW fttY 
Amouat of Bond * . s l C L £ _ C £ _ _ _ Effect** D« t« .U l_JLJ2S» 
'-J-lm >,' t ' IU.V 1 
<C»ty> <SUtC) 
19 HU PtfrtUr fond <ftfl (Give t i t le, paalUoa or ^ 
[Glee « « M t and n m n t e l o name a j Ofcfaiee) 
Appfioa*r*o«upat»oet or buameee t i < t f d f frf ( I t ft U C .Howl 
$ a g k O Married Q Divorced Q Alimony Payment* $-
Statement of applicant's Aaaets and Liabilities aa of. ic I V?Tr - I f (CoeapttU c a W U ^ } 
CHCCK A P P U C A 6 I & SCCTION O H POU-OWINO PAGES rm$T TO sec IP THIS F I N A N C I A L STATCMCNT ISNCCCSSAAV. 
I M P O R T A N T FOR C O N T R A C T O R S USE F O R M SO 
. , _ „ at — d taiammtoce hctohy t — m e t W l a T M t * W ' t I T T C O M P A N Y (Urn O m p i a Q f I 
hood aaaa st»*h other haada aa may now or har tarter fee raamtad by oe am behalf of the aJM*toamv 
< mfwntat toa and t u u m c a u contained ia this ipp«ee«t«Hi tee tene, and the t
 r 
I any bnnd for the apan nanl, e o ta t antne faaeered neeehv eeo 
• > « • • aortal y ib«4 *a» mfweaou 
» n of the t o i y — y batomtna •maty , or e-
by the C i t a p i a y the 
ahad >~ r»«iMJ«o 10 mahc peymeat. 
if a* »*>«* «pplttd for » * romrar t or perfoni 
now 4u# o« natraitey to a e r u m * aue uadey ta*d < 
* i p m i w , and loaetiy and aeeeeady earee to mdemaaly end aeon mdeaneaamd the Caanpane lane* and 
oamanea, t n n n t t l feee and o t n t a n t i wia iamoor which the Cwmpany abaft at any atone eantain m inane, 
a n o t i r or i m n i i man eaeh head and agree to ptaeo trt tn the C jmpaay fmena an aeoct any teatm ot < 
Comi 
r boad then the aneHfcenl doot harehv aanan. < 
m e n u and retata 
*»f that ay the Ce 
t to the Coeanenv any «nd «ii moneyf 
mpphaai. tooav .Monaa, r e i t p m r e t and 
ia rro^arvo The nan i n i *J a e*d hand h r the 
anany •heh not ohtaaiia tb* Company to taana a runtraet. oarforaaance or any other hand tonatrod tf appniant • btd • ai»>n<ed. < 
The Contnany n t i oecnao to hetame entety on any hmm of the •nnhtan i . and In eaaa tt dooa act aa atarety dtaii haao the rajht to ntthdrew <it coneet 
» nheneyet tt thad tea tit «nd aa any event the Cnaapany afceJI net be fennteed lo nlaaiaat the raaaon u»oa whiah m action ta hated, end %*a* nan her 
raontiacthlr fur «ay ioaa m oamaae that may be mat at no a by teeaon of each ardon. Withont a«c*«« to the apnttcaat ot tndcwniioea, the Coaapaav at one 
u a i * m*v ,ncrp%ac v>r docroaa* n« ponalty U aay bond of the applicant. <* may rttanee the term* or coaditn>oa of «av tMCh bund and ihia aarovment ana l 
mimt apatv t*» any Mara bond *» %•* altarod 
\A^ent r . U i t i l a , , , .utfa m, / % 
wtTHf t \ » l ^ ^ ^ I X _ ^ 
MtV . t aJ J tlL 
^» tt#* Z i | i ( \ * i f li'ji* l 
»fmt*%4fTfA£l tJ^*^^ 
«>NP i I A«4lirit n o V ^ ^ L I A P BKSUKCTO 
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APPUCAlLt FXT^ Mf* UM POLLOWtlKa PACU 
-•rf 
TERRY M. PLANT 
HANSON, DOHH, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Western Surety Company 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 363-7611 
RECEIVE.: ~~ 
j FEB ' 51988 
HANSON, DUNN 
.EPPERSON & SMt^. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
•• n i l i ill II ir r i i n i i i n tiin<i H I irrrihn f i i i i i t tUrfxwi m n n inmmii ' n u r i i r r i n m r m r i m r 
ALLSTATE ENTERPRISES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
GLENN WILLIAM HERIFORD, 
HERITAGE MOTORS, and 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
T h i r d - P a r t y P l a i n t i f f , 
-vs -
JAN L. HERIFORD, JOSEPH F. 
OLLIVIER and LINDA S. OLLIVIER, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 71286 
+k+d*im*im+m*l+k*kt****+t**m*+»*Kmm***mmaU+**m+^*~h*+***, 
This matter having come before the Court for trial on 
May 7, 1987, the plaintiff Allstate Enterprises, Inc. having 
settled and resolved its claim prior to trial and said settlement 
reflected in a separate document. The trial between third-party 
A-5 
plaintiff Western Surety Company and third-party defendant Joseph 
P. Ollivier having gone forward; the third-party plaintiff 
Western Surety Company being represented by Terry M. Plant and 
the third-party defendant being represented by Allen K. Young, 
and the Court having heard evidence and argument of counsel 
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law* 
FINDINGS;kQF. FACT 
1. That the Application for Bond and attached 
financial statement marked Exhibits 3 and 5, respectively/ were 
signed by third-party defendant Joseph F. Ollivier* 
2. That Mr. Ollivier's involvement with the business 
of Heritage Motors was to provide financial support to the 
business* 
3* That an integral part of the automobile business 
was the obtaining of a motor vehicle dealer bond since said bond 
is required by law before business can be done as an automobile 
dealer* 
4* That Joseph F* Ollivier knew that his role with the 
business was to provide financial support for the business which 
included the financial support needed for the issuance of the 
Western Surety bond in question* 
5* That the indemnification provisions found on 
Exhibit 3, the Application for Bondf are an integral part of that 
document• 
A-6 
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6. That since Mr. Ollivier signed Article 3, he cannot 
escape the language of the Application for Bond which requires 
him to imdemnify Western Surety. 
7. That Western Surety had no obligation to make an 
annual renewal of the indemnification agreement as long as annual 
premium payments are made. There is no necessity for Western 
Surety to renew the application and indemnity agreement every 
year* 
8. That the third-party defendant Joseph Ollivier has 
substantial education and business background. Given his 
background, he knew or should have known of the impact of the 
indemnification language contained in Exhibit 3, Application for 
Bond. 
1. That Western Surety is entitled to judgment against 
the third-party defendant Western Surety in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of the indemnification agreement signed by 
third-party defendant Joseph Ollivier and marked Exhibit 3 
hereto. 
2. That said judgment will include all monies which 
defendant Western Surety has paid to Allstate Enterprises in 
settlement of the claim against Western Surety under the bond 
which total $9,000. Further, Western Surety shall be entitled to 
recover attorney's fees, costs, and all other expenses associated 
A-7 
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with being a surety and as otherwise set forth in the indemnity 
agreement. 
3. That since Mr. Ollivier signed Exhibit 3, he is 
charged with the legal responsibility of knowing the content of 
the document which requires him to indemnify Western Surety 
Company as set forth in the Conclusion of Law No* 1. 
DATED t h i s JU 
•*****«*£***» day of SsS*^^ , 1987, 
BY THE COOI&: 
HONORABLE BOYD L. PARK 
Fourth D i s t r i c t Judge 
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in a normal equity case. And a surety is not like a 
bank. A bank loan is an entirely different animal than 
one of a surety and an indemnification. Mr. Young has 
done a fine job of the comparison I don't believe they 
are the same animal at all. 
I am concerned and feel some regret because of the 
circumstances and maybe some who would feel a little 
different than I would with regard to the case but 
it appears to me that I have to find that the Application 
for the Bond contains sufficient language for 
indemnification and that signatures thereto once they have-
been accepted by the surety company and a bond has been 
issued you become fixed and they are an integral part of 
the bond. 
I have to believe that it is Mr. Ollivier's signature. 
I can appreciate that he might not remember it but there is 
no evidence to the contrary that it is not his signature 
other than his lack of memory and that he doesn't think 
he would have signed such a thing because he doesn't 
think he would have signed it unless he had read it. He 
may not have read it but that would not allow him to 
escape from the terms of the application and the 
indemnification contained therein because he , if he did 
in fact sign it, and that is a finding of the court that he 
did sign it. 
A-9 
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Q And in fact you became a shareholder in a 
corporation by the name of Heritage Motors did you not? 
A Yes. 
Q What per cent of that business did you own in 
1978? 
A I think that it was 20 per cent I am not positive 
about that because the shares eventually became worthless 
but I think it was 20 per cent, 
Q And you are aware of another claim pending against 
you Valley Bank vs. Western Surety vs. Yourself? 
A Yes. 
Q You know that claim? 
A Yes. 
Q You aware that your attorney has submitted 
a memorandum in that case in support of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment have you read that? 
A (no answer) 
Q In that memorandum they indicate that you own one 
third of the business is that closer to your accurate 
or 20 per cent? 
A I probably have to I looked and I couldn't find 
any records or certificates I thought it was 25 per cent 
but you know I could be wrong about that but I believe it 
was 20 per cent. 
Q But nonetheless you were a part owner of the busme 
A-10 
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and you knew that? 
A I owned some shares in it), 
Q And that you heard Mr. Heriford testify 
haven't you? 
A Yes. 
Q And you heard him-tell this court that your 
primary purpose for being involved was that he didn't have 
the financial wherewithal to get the business going and he 
relied on your financial strength to do that? 
A To get a loan at Zions Bank yes. 
Q But and you would agree with his statement that I 
just made wouldn't you? 
A Yes he was relying on my financial ability. 
Q Because he had none and was a 27 year old newly-
wed without anything? 
A I didnut know that he didn't have anything. I 
knew that he apparently , in our discussions, did not have 
enough- to get a flooring line that was what our discussions 
were about. 
Q And so you do recall going to Zions Bank and 
signing a number of documents floorinq agreements and 
other such documents whereby you bound yourself to be 
financially responsible for loans and things that which 
were necessary to get the business going didn't you? 
A Collateralized loans yes. 
A-ll 
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1 Western Surety Company being first duly.sworn was examined 
2 and testified as follows: 
3 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR, PLANT: 
5 Q Would you please state your name sir? 
5 A Joseph F. Ollivier. 
7 Q Present address? 
g A 1040 Windsor Drive, Provo, Utah. 
9 Q Presently married? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q To who? 
12 A Allyson, that is my wife's name. 
13 Q How long have you been married to her? 
14 A About 8 months. 
15 Q You were formerlly married to Linda Ollivier were 
16 y°u n o t ? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q From when to when did that marriage last? 
19 A From 1967 until 1982. 
20 Q How many years is that? 
21 A 14 I think , 14 or 15. 
22 Q What do you do for a living? 
23 A I am a stock broker. 
24 Q And you have a degree from some institution? 
25 A Yes I graduated from B.Y.U. 
A-12 
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Q In what? 
A In business I am sorry statistics. 
Q When? 
A In 1965. 
Q How old are you? 
A I am 45. 
Q You just have a Bachelor's degree? 
A Yes. 
Q Any post graduate degrees? 
A Yes. 
Q What? 
A I have a masters in business. 
Q Business Administration? 
A Yes a MBA Degree. 
Q Where was that? 
A From Stanford University. 
Q When? 
A In 1967. 
Q All right and do you work with a brokerage company 
here? 
A Yes, I work for Shearson Lehman Brothers. 
Q How long have you worked for them? 
A Since 1982. 
Q Where did you work before that? 
A For Foster and Marshall which is another brokerage 
A-13 
91 
firm acquired by Shearson. 
Q When did or how long did you work for Foster and 
Marshall? 
A Since 1979. 
Q Where did you work before that? 
A I worked for a company called Dayne and Bosworth. 
Q That is a brokerage firm also? 
A That is also a brokerage firm also. 
Q How long did you do that? 
A For approximately six years. 
Q You have had a lot of business experience haven't 
you Mr. Ollivier? 
A I have had some yes. 
Q A lot haven't you? 
A In the brokerage business yes. 
Q In the brokerage business you have to sign a 
lot of documents and you have to sign a lot of agreements and 
you have to sign a lot of contracts don't you? 
A I have to sign customer agreements yes. 
Q And you are used to signing documents as a matter 
of course I would imagine? 
A Yes. 
Q And you understand that when you sign a document 
it is implied by law that you have read that document? 
A Yes I believe I do. 
A-14 
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in this particular agreement that bothers me that is my mosjt 
difficult hurdle to get over. However, in view of the 
education of Mr. Ollivier and in view of his business 
experience I am going to have to decide that favor 
of~the bonding company Western Surety. 
So based on that reasoning and those facts it is the 
Judgment of this court that Western Surety have a Judgment 
over against Mr. Ollivier for their amount of money that 
they are obligated to pay under the bond and for such 
costs as they have incurred and Reasonable attorney 
fees. Reasonable attorney fees will be submitted by 
affidavit in accordance with our Administrative Order I 
think it is I am not sure 25 but I am not sure what it- is. 
You will submit copies to Mr. Young of those affidavits 
so that he can raise any objections that he feels are 
appropriate. 
Also Mr. Plant you will draw the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment in this matter and submit 
those to Mr. Young under Rule 2.9 and then to the court. 
Anything further? 
MR. PLANT: No Your Honor. 
THE COURT: This is the first case maybe it will 
get a test if there is a lot of them out there. 
MR. YOUNG: Will have tjo Your Honor. 
THE COURT: May very well I can understand that. 
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1 Q Did anyone ever communicate with you to determine 
2 whether you were still^first of all still associated with 
3 Heritage Motors Inc.? 
4 A No. 
5 Q Did - -
6 I MR. PLANT: You mean the "world"? 
7 MR- YOUNG: No. 
8 BY MR.YOUNG: 
9 Q Did Western Surety or Blackley Insurance ever 
10 either write you~„or call you or communicate with you to 
11 determine whether you were still affiliated with Heritage 
12 Motors? 
13 I A No they didn't. 
14 Q Did you intend to be affiliated with Heritage 
15 after 1982? 
16 I A No. 
17 Q Had you known you had any obligation what would 
18 you have done? 
19 MR. PLANT: Objection speculation. 
20 THE COURT: Sustained. 
2i MR* YOUNG: I think he can testify about what 
22 h^ would have done Your Honor unless counsel agreeable to 
23 stipulate that he had no obligation or orally stipulate 
24 Mr. Ollivier knew that he had no obligation? 
25 THE COURT: Well I don't, he can make a statement 
A-16 
Q And you knew that wsis part of your obligation to 
tell them so they knew you weren't going to be a guarantor 
anymore didn't you? 
A Well just telling them wouldn't have done any good. 
I had to make arrangements to have the loan paid off. 
Q To go through that procedure to take care of 
getting off the loan? 
A Yes. 
Q Because you knew that they relied on you and 
your financial ability in making their loans? 
K Right \»ell the^ relied or> ^ e as a cotguarantor . 
They dealt really with Mr. Heriford but relied on me 
somewhat. 
Q Your money right? 
A Relied on my financial strength in case- of 
a oroblem. 
Q Did you ever notify Western Surety that you were 
no longer willinq to.serve as an indemnitor under the 
Application for Bond? 
A I didn't know if Western Surety existed until abou 
six months ago. 
Q Did you ever notify them of any intent on your Dart 
not to be an indemnitor in behalf of Heritage Motors 
Inc.? 
A No. 
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